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Notes
Torts-Automobile Accident as a Transaction Within
the Meaning of the Dead Man Statute
The subject case' involves an action for personal injuries re-
sulting from a two car collision at a country road intersection in
which Mueller, driver of one of the cars, was killed. The driver
of the other car, Fincham Sr., brought the action against the de-
cedent's estate as father and next friend of his eight year old son,
Fincham Jr., who was riding with him as his guest.2 There were
no eye witnesses to the accident. At the trial, Fincham Sr. was
allowed to testify as to his own vehicle and his operation there-
of,3 but not as to the action of the decedent and his vehicle, the
trial judge sustaining objections to such testimony under the so
called Dead Man Statute.4  HELD: Judgment for defendant.
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that there was no showing of negligence on decedent's
part, which ruling was affirmed on appeal.
Under section 25-308 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,
Fincham Sr., as next friend for his son, was liable for the costs of
the action.5 This liability has been deemed sufficient to constitute
a direct legal interest so as to bar the witness from testifying
1 Fincham v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958).
2 In accordance with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-307 (Reissue 1956) which says
in part: "The action of an infant must be brought by his guardian or
next friend . . ."
3 Fincham Sr. was allowed to testify as to the speed of his vehicle; where
he was when he first looked for other cars; where he was when he
looked again; but on one occasion when he was asked what he did
when he saw decedent's car coming, objection to his testimony was
sustained.
- Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956). The material part provides:
"No person having a direct legal interest in the result of any civil
action or proceeding, shall be permitted to testify to any transaction
or conversation had between the deceased person and the witness . . ."
5 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-308 (Reissue 1956). "The guardian or the next
friend is liable for the costs of the action brought by him .. ." See
also Kliffel v. Bullock, 8 Neb. 336, 1 N.W. 250 (1879).
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under the Nebraska Dead Man Statute.6 Thus, the question of
whether or not an automobile accident is a transaction within
the meaning of section 25-1202 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes
was properly before the Nebraska Supreme Court. It is interest-
ing to note that had Fincham Jr.'s mother or a third party guard-
ian brought the action for him, the above question would not
have arisen, since whether the accident was a transaction or not,
Fincham Sr. would no doubt have been a competent witness as
he would not have had a direct legal interest in the result of the
action.7
"The purpose of the Dead Man Statutes is to prevent injus-
tice and fraud, and to put the parties on equal terms."s  Courts
have expressed the fear that an interested witness might testify
falsely about a matter the deceased, if living, could contradict; 9
they feel that the admission of such testimony would place in
great peril the estates of the dead;' 0 and further, that the right
6 Ransom v. Schmela, 13 Neb. 73, 12 N.W. 926 (1882); Smith v. Perry,
52 Neb. 738, 73 N.W. 282 (1897); See also Tecumseh Nat Bank v. McGee,
61 Neb. 702, 722, 85 N.W. 849 (1901) quoting Norval J. in Kroh v. Heins,
48 Neb. 691, 698, 67 N.W. 771 (1896): ". . . A direct legal interest in
the event of an action disqualifies a witness from testifying to a
transaction or conversation with the deceased, whether such interest
be great or small."
7 In W. E. Belcher Lumber Co. v. Harrell, 252 Ala. 392, 41 So.2d 385
(1949), the mother as next friend for her minor son brought an action
for injuries the son sustained in a collision between an automobile
and a truck. It was important to show that the truck driver was
acting as an agent for the defendant company. The court ruled that
the plaintiff's father was not disqualified under the dead mans statute,
code 1940 Tit. 7, § 433, to testify to a conversation had with W. E.
Belcher, the corporate defendant's president, about the agency of the
truck because the father had no pecuniary interest in the outcome of
the suit. In Oft v. Ohrt, 128 Neb. 848, 260 N. W. 571 (1935) an action
by a mother against her daughter, the daughter as grantee of a deed
from the mother and deceased father sought reformation of the deed;
the other daughters and their husbands were allowed to testify as
to transactions and communications with the deceased, notwithstand-
ing the fact that they had similar contracts with the mother and de-
ceased faher. See also, In Re Jelinek's Estate, 146 Neb. 452, 20 N.W.2d
325 (1945) where brothers and sisters with similar claims against an
estate were allowed to testify for their sister. The claimant's husband
was also deemed competent to testify.
8 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 132b p. 558 (1957)
9 Bankers Trust v. Bank of Rockville Center, 114 N.J.Eq. 391, 168 A.
733 (1933).
10 Owens v. Owens, 14 W.Va. 88 (1878).
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and privilege of testifying must be mutual.1 With these reasons
in mind, the Nebraska court found ample authority for determin-
ing an accident a transaction.
Several Nebraska cases in referring to the Dead Man Statute
have said that: "The word 'transaction', as used in this section,
embraces every variety of affairs, the subject of negotiations, ac-
tions, or contracts between the parties."'12 A transaction has also
been defined as an action in which both the witness and the de-
cedent have participated and to which the decedent, if alive,
could testify of his own personal knowlege. 13 In 1956 a Nebraska
District Court ruled that a surviving defendant driver, when
sued by the administratrix of the other driver, was barred from
testifying about the facts of the accident; but as the defendant
prevailed, the Supreme Court did not review this ruling.' 4
Authority from other states with statutes which do not qual-
ify the word transaction with the term "personal" or " person-
ally," supports the Nebraska holding. These cases illustrate two
views as to the admission of testimony when a collision between
two vehicles or a vehicle and a pedestrian is involved: (1) The
survivor may be barred from testifying both to his own acts and
those of the decedent;' 5 (2) The survivor may be allowed to
testify as to his own acts but not as to the decedent's. 6
Our Supreme Court, in disagreement with the trial court in
the subject case, 17 is of the opinion that testimony as to both per-
1 Newman v. Tipton, 191 Tenn. 461, 234 S.W.2d 994 (1950); Wamsley et. al.
v. Crook, 3 Neb. 344 (1874), quoting at page 351: "Death having sealed
the lips of the one, the law seals the lips of the other."
12 Wilson v. Wilson, 83 Neb. 562, 563, 120 N.W. 147 (1909), citing Smith
v. Perry, 52 Neb. 738, 73 N.W. 282 (1897) and Kroh v. Heins, 48 Neb.
691, 67 N.W. 771 (1896).
13 Nelson v. Janssen, 144 Neb. 811, 14 N.W.2d 662 (1944) citing Hlavaty
v. Blair, 101 Neb. 414, 163 N.W. 330 (1917), with approval.
14 Judge John H. Kuns ruling in Wolcott v. Drake, 162 Neb. 56, 75 N.W.2d
107 (1956).
'5 Andreades v. McMilan, 256 S.W.2d 477 (1953). The Texas court ex-
pressed grave doubts that an automobile accident ought to be within
the meaning of the word transaction but it felt constrained from the
rulings in prior cases to include such an occurrence. Between pedes-
trians and autos, Miller v. Walsh's Administratrix, 240 Ky. 822, 43
S.W.2d 42 (1931); Wright v. Wilson, 154 F2d 616 (1946), Van Meter v.
Goldfarb, 317 Il1. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
16 Strode v. Dyer, 115 W.Va. 733, 177 S.E. 878 (1934); Kilmer v. Gustafson,
211 F.2d 781 (1954); USAC Transport v. Corley, 202 F.2d 8 (1953).
17 See footnote 3 supra.
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sons actions should be excluded.'8 It appears that it made slight
difference to Fincham's case which view was taken. Even if
Fincham Sr.'s testimony as to his own actions proved he was free
from negligence, there is. no presumption that the decedent was
negligent, nor does the mere happening of an accident prove
there was negligence.' 9 As the burden of proof was on the plain-
tiff, Fincham Jr., the admission of Fincham Sr.'s testimony about
his own acts put the plaintiff's case in little better position than
if this testimony had been completely barred. Similarly, a sur-
vivor as a defendant would gain no substantial advantage if his
testimony about his own action was held not to be within the
Statute. Some evidence of his actions would necessarily have to
be introduced by the representative of the deceased, and the
surviving defendant's incompetency as to this evidence would be
removed under the waiver provisions of the Dead Man Statute.2 0
But the admission of his testimony under the waiver provision of
the Statute would not help the surviving defendant on the issue
of the decedent's contributory negligence because his testimony
is circumscribed by the evidence introduced by the deceased's
representative.
18 Fincham v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 386, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1953). 'We can
see no logical reason for such a holding for if the factual situation
brings it within the statute then the statute necessarily excludes all
of the testimony relating thereto."
In the recent case of Olsen v. Best, 167 Neb. 198 (1958), our court
makes the loose statement at page 200 that: "Any evidence by the
plaintiff relative to and tending to destroy the effect of that trans-
action is incompetent under the Dead Man's Statute."
'9 Price v. King, 161 Neb. 123, 72 N.W.2d 603 (1955); Wolcott v. Drake,,
162 Neb. 56, 75 N.W.2d 107 (1956); Schroeder v. Sharp, 153 Neb. 73,
43 N.W.2d 572 (1950).
20 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1956) "... unless the evidence of
the deceased person shall have been taken and read in evidence by
the adverse party in regard to such transaction or conversation or un-
less such representative shall have introduced a witness who shall
have testified in regard to such transaction or conversation, in which
case the person having such direct legal interest may be examined
in regard to the facts testified to by such deceased person or such
witness .. ..
Note how the court used this waiver clause in Van Meter v. Gold-
farb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925). A boy was struck and killed
by defendant's car. The boy's brother as next of kin was one of those
for whom the suit was brought. The court held that the accident was
a transaction within the Illinois Dead Man Statute, thus allowing the
defendant to testify as to the occurrence since the deceased boy's
brother had testified to what he had observed.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
The majority stated in their opinion that any change in the
severity of the statute should come through legislation. In 1940
the New York Legislature acted to remove a claim of negligence,
based on the operation of a motor vehicle, from the purview of
the New York Dead Man Statute.21 The writer believes that not
only would Nebraska benefit from removing auto accidents from
the scope of the Dead Man Statute, but that the adoption of a
statute which removes all interest disqualifications would cure
many of the difficulties which arise in practice. A statute along
the following lines is suggested:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit, or
proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the same as a
party or otherwise. In actions, suits, or proceedings by or against
the representatives of deceased persons, any statement of the de-
ceased, whether written or oral, shall not be excluded as hearsay,
provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the state-
ment was made by the decedent, and that it was made in good
faith and on the decedent's personal knowledge. 22
Notwithstanding the need for legislation, the writer, in
agreement with the dissent in the subject case, is not convinced
that the court, in order to avoid judicial legislation, was required
21 N.Y. Civil Practice Act, Evidence § 347 as amended by L. 1940, ch. 620
provides that a person shall not be incompetent to testify to the facts
of an accident which involves a claim of negligence based upon the
operation of a motor vehicle.
22 The admission of statements of the decedent is the counterpart of the
abolishment of the unenlightened and unpractical disqualification of
the survivor as a witness. The admission of the statements of the
deceased is justified as an exception to the Hearsay rule as it unites
the essential requirements of such an exception (See Wigmore on
Evidence §§ 1420-1424, 1940).
The suggested exception to the Hearsay rule has met with favor
of the bar and ease of interpretation in the states in which it has
been adopted. In Massachusetts the statute reads: MGLA c. 233 § 65,
"In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a declaration of a
deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or
as private conversation between husband and wife, as the case may
be, if the court finds that it was made in good faith and upon the
personal knowledge of the declarant." In 1937-38, The American Bar
Associations Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence
recommended the enactment of a law similar to the Massachusetts
law by a vote of 48 to 1. Rhode Island (G.L. 1956, 9-19-11) has a statute
similar to that of Massachusetts; and in Oregon (ORS 41-850) and
Alaska (c. 6 comp. L. 1949, § 58-6-1), when a party to a civil action
or suit by or against an executor or administrator appears as a witness
in his own behalf, statements of the deceased concerning the same
matter may also be proven.
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to construe the word "transaction" so broadly as to include an
automobile accident.
Section 25-1201 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes states who
is competent to testify as a witness. This section is a general
statute which removes the old common law disqualification of
the parties to a lawsuit and all persons having a direct interest
in the outcome. 23 As the Dead Man Statute, section 25-1202, is
an exception to the general qualification statute, section 25-1201,
it should be strictly construed.2 4
The dictum in prior Nebraska cases suggests that a transac-
tion means a mutual personal transaction in which each party is
an active participant, rather than an involuntary, fortuitous col-
lision.25  The language of the Nebraska Dead Man Statute does
not demand that a survivor be prohibited from giving his unilat-
eral observations as to a physical situation or event.
An Arkansas case, Rankin v. Morgan,26 which is in point on
fact and statute, held that a collision did not constitute a trans-
action with the testator or intestate. Although the decision was
apparently reached without consulting any authority that was
apposite to the problem, at least the Arkansas court did not feel
constrained by its statute to hold a collision to be a transaction.
Cases from Iowa, Maryland, and Wisconsin have held that an
automobile accident is not a transaction within their respective
Dead Man Statutes.2 7 It is true that the statutes in these states
qualify the word transaction with the term personal or person-
23 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1201 (Reissue 1956) quoting in part: "Every human
being of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath,
is a competent witness in all cases, civil or criminal, except as other-
wise herein declared . . ." The exceptions declared are: (1) Persons
of unsound mind, (2) certain communications between husband and
wife, (3) privileged communications of attorney and client, (4) clergy
or priest* concerning a confession.
24 Sorensen v. Sorensen, 56 Neb. 729, 733, 77 N.W. 68 (1898): "In other
words, the reason for disqualifying the witness must be found in ex-
press provisions of law, and the witness is not to be disqualified by
a strained or strict construction." See the cases cited on page 734
of the Sorensen opinion, and also In re Jelinek, 146 Neb. 452, 20 N.W.
2d 325 (1945), and 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 387 p. 917 (1953).
25 Harnett v. Holdrege, 5 Neb. (Unoff.) 114, 97 N.W. 443 (1903). In re
House, 145 Neb. 886, 18 N.W.2d 500 (1945).
26 Rankin v. Morgan, 193 Ark. 751, 102 S.W.2d 552 (1937).
27 Turbot v. Repp, 72 N.W.2d 565 (1955); Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209
Md 304, 121 A.2d 218 (1956); Seligman v. Orth, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W.
115 (1931).
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ally and are therefore more restrictive than Nebraska's statute,
but the final determination of the scope rests in the courts broad
or strict construction of the words used, as West Virginia also
has a "personal" statute and its courts have held.an auto accident
to be a transaction.2 8 Perhaps our court would have been forced
to construe broadly the word transaction if Nebraska had an
equal knowledge rule such as found in Michigan's statute;2 9 but
as the Nebraska statute is not bound up by such a rule, there
was room for the court to give a stricter construction to the word
transaction.
Several of the cases relied upon by the defendant and cited
by the court dealt with actions between either the estate of a
decedent driver and a surviving passenger or the estate of a de-
cedent passenger and a surviving driver.30  The significant factual
difference makes these cases dubious authority for holding a two
car collision to be a transaction as even Wisconsin recognizes that
there is a transaction between a driver and his own passenger.3 1
Reference to text writers supports the contention that not only
should the Dead Man Statutes be construed strictly, but that they
should be abolished completely. Authorities such as McCormick,
Wigmore, and Morgan have attacked the statutes as anomalies
which breed injustice and uncertainty.32  Professor Wigmore in
his treatise on Evidence asserts that the Dead Man Statutes are
open to every one of the objections successfully urged against the
common law interest rule in general. These objections are set
out in Section 578 of his treatise as follows:
1) That the supposed danger of interested persons testify-
ing falsely exists to a limited extent only;
28 See Strode v. Dyer, 115 W.Va. 733, IV S.E. 878 (1934) interpreting
Code 1931 57-3-1.
29 (Mich. Statute) chap. 266, § 27-914 (1938) ".. the opposite party, if
examined as a witness in his own behalf, shall not be admitted to
testify at all to matters which, if true, must have been equally within
the knowledge of such deceased person ..."
30 Davis v. Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 16 S.E.2d 655 (1941); Stephens v. Short,
41 Wyo. 324, 285 P. 797 (1930); Boyd v. Williams, 207 N.C. 30, 175 S.E.
832 (1934); McCarthy v. Woolston, 210 App. Div. 152, 205 N.Y.S. 507
(1924).
31 Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 332, 235 N.W. 797 (1931).
32 See Wigmore on Evidence, § 578 and 578a (1940); McCormick on Evi-
dence, § 65 (1954); Morgan and others, The Law of Evidence, Some
Proposals for its Reform, chap. 3, p. 31 (Yale Univ. Press, 1927).
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2) That, even so, yet, so far as they testify truly, the ex-
clusion is an intolerable injustice;
3) That no exclusion can be so defined as to be rational,
consistent, and workable;
4) That in any case the test of cross-examination and the
other safeguards for truth are a sufficient guaranty
against frequent false decision.
Are greater chances to obtain the truth gained by omission
or admission? It is contrary to experience that people are so
corrupt as to perjure and at the same time so adroit as to de-
ceive courts and juries. "In the great majority of instances the
witnesses are honest, however much interested, and in most cases
of dishonesty the falsehood of the testimony is detected, and
deceives none." 33 In addition, a claimant so corrupt as to commit
perjury would not hesitate to suborn a third person, who would
not be disqualified, to swear to a false story.
The demand for removal of disqualification for interest un-
der the Dead Man Statutes is not merely the result of Law Pro-
fessors theorizing with their usual eloquence. In 1922 a com-
mittee was appointed by the Commonwealth Trust Fund of New
York to inquire in to the possibilities of reform in the rules of
evidence. The committee put the survivor rule to a pragmatic
test, selecting the state of Connecticut whose statute admits the
survivors testimony and also declarations and memoranda of the
deceased on a ruling by the trial judge that they were made in
good faith and on the decedent's personal knowledge. 34  A poll
was taken of over two hundred members of the bar and bench
of Connecticut. The results of the poll showed that 89% of the
higher court Judges and 85% of the Practitioners having ex-
perience with the statute in six or more cases were in favor of
permitting testimony of survivors under the statute and felt it
33 New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading, 1st report, 1848.
For an interesting commentary on human nature, human ingenuity,
and the weapon of cross-examination, See Corliss J., in St. John v.
Lofland, 5 N.D. 140, 143, 64 N.W. 930 (1895).
34 G.S. Conn. c. 387 § 7868 (Revision 1949) "No person shall be dsiqualified
as a witness in any action by reason of his interest in the event of
the same as a party or otherwise . . ." and § 7895 "In actions by or
against the representatives of deceased persons .... the entries, mem-
oranda and declarations of the deceased, relevant to the matter in
issue, may be received as evidence . .."
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aided in the ascertainment of truth.3 5  The opposition to this
liberal statute was in inverse ratio to experience with it.
With the above objections to the Dead Man Statute in mind,
the writer suggests that the Nebraska court should have narrowed
their range when construing the Nebraska statute. As the Ne-
braska law now stands, a man, alone, carefully and lawfully
driving his automobile, who collides with a carload of drunken
rowdies and kills one of them, is barred from testifying in a
suit against the deceased person's estate. Of course, if the care-
ful driver is sued, his disqualification is removed in regard to
facts of the transaction testified to by a witness for the deceased
since the statute can only be used as a shield and not a sword;
but still, the entire direction of the prudent driver's case is in
the hands of the drunken louts. Does our statute demand such
consequences or are they the result of judicial construction of
the word transaction?
No testimony was offered by Fincham Jr., therefore, the
court was not faced with the question of whether or not there
was a transaction between the decedent, driver of the one car,
and the plaintiff, guest in the other car. But as the court de-
fines a transaction as every variety of affairs, the subject of
actions between the parties; all methods by which one person
can derive impressions from another; and an occurrrence of which
both the decedent and the other party had knowledge, they would
no doubt hold that such a relation existed.36
If such would be the holding, a logical sequence of events
would raise many difficult questions such as the competency of
passengers in buses or trains in a suit against the estate of the
deceased driver of a vehicle in collision with the bus or train.
These questions would be solved and injustice avoided if the
court had not placed a broad definition on the word transaction;
perhaps, however, the question now is not what the court should
have done, but rather, how far will the court go.
John F. Haessler 60
35 The committee report was published in 1927; Morgan "The Law of
Evidence, Some Proposals for its reform" (Yale Univ. Pres) see chap.
3, p. 31.
36 See definitions of transaction on p. 383 of the subject case, Fincham
v. Mueller, 166 Neb. 376, 89 N.W.2d 137 (1958); and the cases cited
in footnotes 11 and 12.
